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BRENNA CLAN1
The Disenfranchisement of the American Indian

THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN
I.

INTRODUCTION
The right to vote is, and has always been, "among the most contentious,

highly charged questions in all of contemporary law."' For one, the right to vote is
not explicitly mentioned in the United States Constitution. It was understood that
states controlled who could and could not vote, because the power of the state to
regulate elections is an "attribute of state sovereignty and the element most
as a sovereign, and such power was not surrendered by
essential to its exi~tence"~
States when states adopted the United States Constitution. Thus, the federal
adjustments to state franchise of elections took the form of "constitutional
amendment rather than federal legislation."3 Resulting were the Fourteenth
~mendment~,
Fifteenths,~ineteenth~,
~wenty-~ourth~,
and Twenty-Sixth

'

James A. Gardner, Liberty. Communitv and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A
Reconsideration of the Rieht to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. Rev. 893,893 (1997).
2
Smilv v . W 285 U.S. 355,366 (1932).
3
Todd J. Zywicki, Federal Judicial Review of State Ballot Access Rermlations: Esca~ef?om the Political
20 T. Marshall L. Rev. 87,97 (1994).
U.S. Const., amend. XIV 5 1, provides "[nlo State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens."
U.S. Const., amend. XV 8 1, provides "[tlhe right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
senitude."
6
U.S. Const., amend. XM 3 1, provides "[tlhe right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex."
7
U.S. Const., amend. XXlV 5 1, provides "[tlhe right of citizens of the United States to vote in any
primary or other election for President or Vice-President, for electors for President or Vice-President, or
for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."

m,

~ m e n d m e n t to
s ~the United States Constitution. Despite these constitutional
amendments, as late as 1948, American Indians were still being denied the right to
vote by states, regardless of having been conferred United States citizenship status
in 1924.
The United States Constitution provides that "[all1 persons born or
naturalized of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
The Constitution further provides that "[all1
Citizens in the several ~tates."~
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of

citizen^."'^ Under these constitutional provisions, having been

granted United States citizenship, the American Indian became a citizen of the
state in which he resided, and therefore, entitled to the same privileges and
immunities as other citizens, by which time, the United States Supreme Court had
recognized the right to vote as a privilege or immunity of United States
citizenship." By 1964, the United States Supreme Court held this right to be

U.S. Const., amend. XXVI 5 1, provides "[tlhe right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age."
9
U.S. Const., Art. VI, 5 2, cl. 1.
lo U.S. Const., amend. XIV g 1.
II
Ex Darte Yarbrough, "The Ku-Klux Klan Cases," 110 U.S. 651 (1884).

fundamental in that it "is preservative of other basic civil and political rights."I2
With this history, why, then, were American Indians being the denied the right to
vote by states as late as 1948?
The history of the enfranchisement of the American Indian is complicated
and complex. This paper will sort through this complicated and complex history.
The paper will first analyze the unique status of Indians and how it excluded them
from the meaning of "citizen," as interpreted by the United State Supreme Court.
It is against this backdrop that the way in which states denied American Indians the
right to vote after the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 will then be analyzed.
I.

INDIANS' NOT AMERICAN CITIZENS
The right to vote is "the most significant characteristic of American

citizen~hi~."'~
By 1820, it was assumed that American "[clitizenship constituted
membership in a federal community requiring allegiance to nation and state.,914
such, "[ilt entitled the citizen fundamental privileges and immunities and in return
bound him to assume duties and obligations toward the community as a

hole.'''^

With respect to Indians, this theory did not apply because "[h]istorically, tribes
stood totally independent international sovereigns, each equal in status to the
United States government, and that structural relationship of tribal nations to the
Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Houghton Mifflin, Encyclopedia of North American Indians.
14
James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship. 1608-1870,287 (The University of
North Carolina Press 1978).
Id.
l3

'*

United States has been largely based upon treaties."I6 This unique independent
status was recognized in the United States Constitution such that Congress shall
have the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with Indian tribes."" In addition, "'theexclusion of "Indians not
taxed" fiom state population rolls for purposes of representation in the House of
.
Representatives [in Article I, section, clause 3 18] impliedly
recognized that tribal

These constitutional
nations as independent of the States and the ~ n i o n . " ' ~
provisions, read together, meant, "Indians were considered to be members of
separate political communities and not part of the ordinary body politic of the
states or of the United ~tates."~'
This "concept of tribal sovereignty had serious inherent weaknesses, but it
did allow courts and executive officers considerable flexibility in determining
issues of citizenship concerning white-Indian

relation^."^'

In Worcester v.

~ e o r a i Justice
a ~ ~ Marshall opined that "[tlhe Cherokee nation [I is a distinct
l6 Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based Upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 31 8,319 (2003).
"US. Const.. Art.I. sec. 8. cl. 3.
18
U.S. const.; Art. I; sec. 2;cl. 3 provides, "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free-persons,including th& bound to Service for
a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons."
l9 Tebben, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. at 322.
Felix Cohen, Handbook on Federal Indian Law, 641 (1982 ed.).
21
Kettner, The Development of American Citizenshiu. 1608-1870 at 298.
22
3 1 U.S. 5 15 (1 832). In Worcester v. Georgia, the Georgia state statute that made it a misdemeanor for
"all white persons, residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation 0 without a license or permit [I from
[I the governor." Id. at 542. A non-Indian, by consent of the Cherokee nation, resided in the Cherokee
nation, was found in violation of the Georgia statute and "condemned to hard labour for four years in the

community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse
between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested
in the government of the United

Justice Marshall based his reasoning on

the fact that "Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original rights, as the undisputed possessors

of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European
potentate."24 In this sense, tribal sovereignty was construed in its exact sense to
mean "distinct, independent political communities."
However, in United States v. Rogers, Justice Taney differed with Justice
Marshall with respect to tribal sovereignty in reasoning that "[tlhe native tribes
who were found on this continent at the time of its discovery have never been
acknowledged or treated as independent nations by the European governments,

nor regarded as the owners of the temtories they respectively occupied. On the
contrary, the whole continent was divided and parceled out, and granted by the

n

penitentiary of Georgia." Id. at 521. The plaintiff in error asserted that "these laws of Georgia are
unconstitutional, void, and of no effect [I because they impair the obligation of the various contracts
formed by and between the aforesaid Cherokee nation and the said United States of America." Id. at 539.
23 1d. at 561.
"Id.
- at 559.

governments of Europe as if it had been vacant and unoccupied land, and the

Indians continually held to be, and treated as, subject to their dominion and
control."25
In Rogers, "a white man, was indicted [I for murder [I of Nicholson, also a
white

in the Cherokee nation, in which, Rogers claimed he was an adopted

Cherokee Indian and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the United
The court disagreed with Rogers. Justice Taney explained that "[hle (Rogers) may
be such adoption become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, and make
himself amenable to their laws and usages. Yet he is not an Indian; and the
exception is confined to those who by the usage and customs of the Indians are
regarded as belonging to their race. It does not speak of members of a tribe, but of

the race generally."28 Thus, "[wlhatever obligations the prisoner may have taken
upon himself by becoming a Cherokee by adoption, his responsibility to the laws
of the United States remained unchanged and undiminished. He was still a white
man, of the white race, and therefore not within the exception in the act of
~ o n ~ r e s s Justice
. " ~ ~ Taney seemed to go beyond "the proposition that tribal

45 U.S.567,572 (1846).

26

m,45 U.S.at 571.

28

Id. at 573.

Id.

r,b,
45 U.S.at 573.

governments possessed any residual characteristics of sovereignty" 30 such that
race seemed to be the basis for renouncing the recognition by Justice Marshall that
tribes were "distinct, independent political communities." It would be Justice
Taney's supposition that would serve as the stumbling block for Indians kom
achieving the right to vote.
Against this backdrop, this section will discuss how courts were able "to
exclude the Native Americans from the status and privileges of American
citi~enshi~."~'
A.

CITIZENSHIP INTENDED ONLY FOR THE WHITE RACE

With respect to American citizenship, it was assumed by 1820 that "the
[American] status was based on individual consent,"32that American citizenship
"entitled the citizen to fundamental privileges and immunities and in return bound
him to assume duties and obligations toward the community as a whole,"33and that
it "constituted membership in a federal community requiring allegiance to nation
and state."34 This assumption held firm,however, American citizenship was
deduced in Scott v. Sanford to apply only to "the white race, and that they [the

Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment and Native American citizens hi^, 17 Const. Commentaty
555,557-558 (2000).
31
Kettner, T I I ~~e v i ~ o ~ mof
e n~merican
t
CitiZenshiD. 1608-1870 at 300.
Id. at 287.
30

''
33

Id.

white race] alone constituted the sovereignty of the Government.,135 This
perception would later complicate matters for the American Indian and their own
citizenship status.
In the case of Sanford v. Scott, Dred Scott, a former slave, commenced suit
in the Circuit Court of the United States "to assert the title of himself and his
.~~
issue was,
family to freedom."36 Scott was a citizen of the state of ~ i s s o u r i At
whether or not the "Circuit Court of the United States [had] jurisdiction to hear and
determine the case."38 In order to determine this, the United States Supreme Court
had to first address the issue: "[clan a negro, whose ancestors were imported into
this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as
such become entitled to all the rights and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed
by that instrument to the citizen?'Jg After a thorough analysis of the "general
terns used in the Constitution of the United states,'&' the Court found that
citizenship was intended only for "the white race," and therefore, the court held
that Dred Scott was not a United States citizen because he was not of "the white
race," and therefore, not entitled to the privileges and immunities, "[olne of which

" 60 U.S.393,419-420
36

Id. at 400.

40

- at 409.
Id.

"Id. at 400.
38 Id. at 400.
39 Id. at 403.

(1856).

'

rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified

in the constitution,'*' because citizenship was intended only for "the white race."
Justice Taney's thorough analysis of the "general terms of the Constitution" is
important to examine because it had some impact on the way in which Indians
were excluded from citizenship.
In determining "whether the general terms used in the Constitution of the
United States, as to the rights of man and the rights of the people, was intended to
include them, or to give to them or their posterity the benefit of any of its
provi~ion,''~ Justice Taney carefully analyzed the "language of the Declaration of
Independence and of the Articles of Confederation, in addition to the plain words
of the Constitution itself; [l the legislation of the different States, before, about the
time, and since, the Constitution was adopted; [I [and] the constant and uniform
Based on his analysis, Justice Taney
action of the Executive ~e~arhnent.''~
concluded that the materials "show[ed] that citizenship [I was perfectly understood
to be confined to the white race; and that they [the white race] alone constituted the
because "[tlhe word white is evidently used to
sovereignty in the ~overnment,'~
exclude the African

" 60 U.S.393,409(1856).

60 U.S.393,409(1856).

''Id. at 426.
Id.at 420.
45

Id. at 420.

In addition to this finding, Justice Taney also had to address Dred Scott's
state citizenship status. In doing so, Justice Taney made clear the meaning of both
United States citizenship and state citizenship, and what both entailed. The narrow
interpretation by Justice Taney with respect to both American and state citizenship
would provide implications for both "the African race" and Indians.
With respect to United States citizenship, the "Constitution has conferred on
Congress the right to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and this right is
evidently exclusive, and has always been held by the court to be so.'*

Taney explained that "[tlhe right of naturalization was

Justice

n surrendered by the States,

and confided to the Federal Government. And this power granted to Congress to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization is, by the well-understood meaning of the
word, confined to persons born in a foreign country, under a foreign Government.
It is not a power to raise to the rank of a citizen any one born in the United States,
who, ftom birth or parentage, by the laws of the country, belongs to an inferior and
subordinate ~lass.'~'Justice Taney further provided that the United States
Constitution "gave to Congress the power to confer this character upon those only
who were born outside of the dominions of the United States. And no law of a

State, therefore, passed since the Constitution was adopted, can give any right of

46
47

60 U.S.393,405(1856).
Id. at 417.

citizenship outside of itsown

Thus, Congress' right of naturalization

is exclusive, but confined only to persons "born in a foreign government, under a
foreign Government." This implied that Congress, even if it could, could not
naturalize Dred Scott into American citizenship because Dred Scot was not a
"[person] born in a foreign country, under a foreign government."
Thus, under this structure, despite that Congress' exclusive authority over
naturalization, Justice Taney was careful to emphasize that states still retained the
power to determine state citizenship, however, that status was confined to that state
only. Justice Taney wrote, "[elach State may still confer them upon an alien, or
any one it thinks proper, or upon any class or description of persons; yet he would
not be a citizen in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the
United States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of the courts, nor to the privileges
and immunities of a citizen in the other

But was not Dred Scott a citizen

of the state of Missouri?
Justice Taney explained that "if persons of the African race are citizens of a
State, and of the United States, they would be entitled to all of these privileges and
immunities under the paramount authority of the Federal Government, and its
courts would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the Constitution and laws of
the State to the contrary notwithstanding. And if the State could limit or restrict
48

60 U.S.393,418 (1856).

49

@. at 405.

them, or place the priority in an inferior grade, this clause of the Constitution
would be unmeaning, and could have no operation; and would give no rights to the
citizen when in another State. He would have none but what the State itself chose
to allow him. This is evidently not the construction or meaning of the clause in
question. It guaranties rights to the citizen, and the State cannot withhold them.""
"But why are the African race, born in the State, not permitted to share in one of
the highest duties of the citizen? The answer is obvious; he is not, by the
institutions and laws of the State, numbered among its people. He forms no part of
the sovereignty of the State, and is not therefore called on to uphold and defend

What does Dred Scott say about about Indians? At the time of Dred Scott, it
was assumed that tribes were considered to still be outside the jurisdiction of the
United States. Thus, it would seem, then, that Indians could be naturalized by
Congress, such that Indians were "born in a foreign government, under a foreign
government." Justice Taney recognized this quandary, and addressed this issue, in
dictum, at the beginning of the Dred Scott opinion. Justice Taney explained:
"The situation of this population [referring to the negro race]
was altogether unlike that of the Indian race. The latter, it is true,
formed no part of the colonial communities, and never amalgamated
with them in social connections or in the government. But although
they were uncivilized, they were yet a free and independent people,
60 U.S. 393,422423 (1856).

'' Id. at 415.

associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by their own
laws. Many of these political communities were situated in territories
to which the white race claimed the ultimate right of dominion. But
that claim was acknowledged to be subject to the right of the Indians
to occupy it as long as they thought proper, and neither the English
nor colonial Governments claimed or exercised anv dominion over
the tribe or nation by whom it was occupied, nor claimed the right to
the possession of the temtory, until the tribe or nation consented to
cede it. These Indian Governments were regarded and treated as
foreign Governments, as much so as if an ocean had separated the red
man from the white and their freedom has constantly been
acknowledged, from the time of the first emigration to the English
colonies to the present day, by the different Governments which
succeeded each other. Treaties have been negotiated with them, and
their alliance sought for in war; and the people who compose these
Indian political communities have always been treated as foreigners
not living under our Government. It is true that the course of events
has brought the Indian tribes within the limits of the United States
under subjection to the white race; and it has been found necessary,
for their sake as well as our own, to regard them as in a state of
pupilage, and to legislate to a certain extent over them and the
territory they occupy. But they may, without doubt, like the subjects
of any other foreign Government, be naturalized by the authority of
Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United States;
and i f a n individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his
abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the
rights and privileges which would belong to an emigrant from any
otherforeign people."52
<

The last sentence is worthy of analysis.
The last sentence seems to indicate two things. First, with respect to "[blut
they may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, be
naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the
United States," Justice Taney wrote: "Congress might, as we before said, have
52

60 U.S. 393,403-404 (1856).

authorized the naturalization of Indians, because they were aliens and foreigners.
But, in their untutored and savage state, no one would have thought of admitting
them as citizens in a civilized community. And, moreover, the atrocities they had
but recently committed, when they were the allies of Great Britain in the
Revolutionary war, were yet flesh in the recollection of the people of the United
States, and they were even then guarding themselves against the threatened
renewal of Indian hostilities. No one supposed then that any Indian would ask for,
or was capable of enjoying, the privileges of an American citizen, and the word
white was not used with any particular reference to

Just as Justice Taney

found that the word white was used to exclude "the African race," Justice Taney
also construed it to mean that the word white also meant to exclude Indians.
However, this seemed to leave open the question: despite that "no one would have
thought of admitting them as citizens in a civilized community," could congress
naturalize Indians? As it stood, naturalization statues only applied to "the white
race."
The second part of Justice Taney's statement, "and ifan individual should
leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode among the whitepopulation, he
would be entitled to all the rights andprivileges which would belong to an
emigrantfrom any otherforeign people," is interesting because latter statement

53

60 U.S. 393,420 (1856).

was not hlly explained in Dred Scott. This second part seems to imply that, for
purposes of naturalization, an Indian would be considered a "white" if the Indian
adopted the ways of the "white," for then, the naturalization statues would apply,
since at that time naturalization status only applied to whites. If this is true, then,
when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, and an Indian assimilated into the
white population, would not an Indian become a United States citizen, and
therefore, entitled to the privileges and immunities of other citizens? This was
precisely the issue in Elk v. Wilkins.
Lastly, Taney's statement is interesting because there were Indians who
were made United States citizens "under explicit provisions of treaty of statute to
that effect, either declaring a certain tribe, or such members of it as chose to remain
behind on the removal of the tribe westward, to be citizens, or authorizing
individuals of particular tribes to become citizens on application to a court of the
United States for naturalization, and satisfactory proof of fitness for civilized
life."54 Such tribes included the Cherokees, Choctaws, Wyandotts, Pottawatornies,
Ottawas, Kickapoos, Brothertown Indians, and the Stockbridge ~ndians." It did
not appear that Dred Scott had any affect on these Indians and their status.
Nonetheless, Dred Scott set the foundation for a complicated history for both
the black and Indian races, in which, it had to take a constitutional amendment to
54

Elk V. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884).

55

Id.

undue narrow rulings of the Dred Scott decision. For one, naturalization only
applied to those persons ''born in a foreign government, under a foreign
government." Second, although an individual could become a citizen of a state,
this did not mean that that individual was a United States citizen, in which case,
only a United States citizen would be entitled to the privileges and immunities
under the United States Constitution. Third, United States citizenship was only
intended for "the white race." Unfortunately, even with the passage of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, American Indians
would continue to be excluded from the meaning of the amendments.

B.

ELK V. WILKINS (1884)

The aftermath of the Dred Scott decision was the ratification of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United State, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in part, provides:

"Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed."
Two years after the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment to the
Constitution was ratified in 1870. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides:
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous servitude."
Ironically, both amendments would be challenged by an Indian who was
denied from voting in a city election.
In Elk v. Wilkins, John Elk was "an Indian, and was born in the United
States, and hard] severed his tribal relation to the Indian tribes, and fully and
completely surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the United States, [I and
[was] a bona fide resident of the State of Nebraska and city of
interesting to note that "the petition
plaintiff was a member.""

mah ha.'"^

It is

[I [did] not show of what Indian tribe the

"When [Elk] applied in 1880 to be a registered voter,

he possessed [I the qualifications of age and residence in State, county, and ward,
required for electors by the Constitution and laws of that

The Nebraska

state Constitution provided that "Every male person of the age of twenty-one years
or upwards, belonging to either of the following classes, who shall have resided in
the State six months, and in the country, precinct or ward for the term provided by
56

112 U.S.94,98 (1884).

" Id. at 98.
58

Id.at 110.

law, shall be an elector. First. Citizens of the United States. Second. Persons
born of foreign birth who shall have declared their intention to become citizens,
conformably to the laws of the United States on the subject of naturalization, at
least thirty days prior to an e~ection."~Despite meeting the state voter
qualifications, the plaintiff was denied from voting by the city registrar because he
was Indian, and by that, he was not a United States citizen, and therefore, not
entitled to vote.60 Elk challenged this assertion claiming that the city registrar was
in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, when the city registrar denied Elk from voting.61
Similarly framed as in Dred scott6*,the issue before the court in

was

"whether an Indian, born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the United
States, is merely by reason of his birth within the United States, and of his
afterwards voluntarily separating himself fkom his tribe and taking up his residency
among white citizens, a citizen of the United States, within the meaning of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the ~onstitution."~'The court found Elk
to "not [be] a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment of the

59

Pl.'s Memorandum of Law.
Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,99 (1884).
61 Id. at 98.
The issue fiamed in Dred Scott was: "Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country,
and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the
Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights and>vileges, and
immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen?"
63 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,99 (1884).

Constitution, [and therefore] ha[d] been deprived of no right secured by the
Fifteenth Amendment, and cannot maintain this action.9,6465
In his analysis, Justice Grey began by stating that "[gleneral acts of
Congress did not apply to Indians, unless, so expressed as to clearly manifest an
intention to include them."66
Justice Grey reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment "contemplates two sources
of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization.'*'

With respect to

birth, Justice Grey found that Indians "are no more 'born in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof,'

[I than the children of subjects of any foreign

governments born within the domain of that government, or the children born
within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign

nation^."^' With respect to naturalization, it was already understood that Indians
could be made citizens this way, as Congress had already done so with particular
tribes.
Despite finding that birth and naturalization applied to Indians, how did
Justice Grey find that Indians were not citizens? Justice Grey referred to section 2
Elk V. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,109 (1884).
This court's holding resembles the holding in Dred Scott, in that, in Dred Scott the court held, that 'the
African race" "are not, and that they are not included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and
can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to the
citizens of the United States." Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,404. The similarities between Dred Scott
k in the same way as
and Elk are very parallel, which raises the question, did Justice Grey decide &
Scott was decided?
Elkv. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884).
67 Id. at 101.
68 Id.
- at 102.
65

of the Fourteenth Amendment which reads "Representatives shall be apportioned
among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed." Justice Grey
explained that "Slavery having been abolished, and the persons formerly held as
slaves made citizens, this clause fixing the apportionment of representatives has
abrogated so much of the corresponding clause of the original Constitution as
counted only three-fifths of such persons. But Indians not taxed are still excluded
from the count, for the reason that they are not citizens. Their absolute exclusion
from the basis of representation, in which all other persons are now included, is
'wholly inconsistent with their being considered

citizen^.'^^

Justice Grey further

explained that "[ilt is also worthy of remark, that the language used, about the
same time, by the very Congress which framed the Fourteenth Amendment, in the
first section of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, declaring who shall be
citizens of the United States, is 'all persons born in the United States, and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.' Such Indians, then, not
being citizens by birth, can only become citizens in the second way mentioned in
the Fourteenth Amendment, by being 'naturalized in the United States,' or [I under
some treaty or ~tatute."'~Thus, mere birth into the United States was not enough
for Elk to become a citizen, rather in order for Elk to become a United States
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citizen, then Congress would have to explicitly do so, either by naturalization,
treaty or statute, because the Fourteenth Amendment meant to exclude Indians.
Therefore, Elk "not being a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, has been deprived of no right secured by the
Fifteenth Amendment, and cannot maintain this action.'"'
As a result, Elk was disenfranchised, and it would not be until 1924 that
Congress enacted the Indian Citizenship Act, which would confer United States
citizenship to all Indians not yet United States citizens, and not until 1948 that
every Indian would have the right to vote.
11.

INDIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT OF 1924
Unlike the aftermath of the Dred Scott decision, in which the Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments were ratified to extend citizenship to "the Afkican race," the
aftermath of Elk was not as exciting. Instead of a constitutional amendment,
Congress would continue to confer United States citizenship to Indians on a varied
statutory basis. For example, the Dawes Act of 1887 would grant citizenship only
to Native Americans who would give up their tribal affiliations. In 1901, Congress
granted citizenship to Native Americans living in Indian Territory. Then in 1919,
Congress passed "law which granted citizenship to 'every American who served in
the military or naval establishments." Finally, in 1924 Congress enacted the Indian

" Elkv.

Wilkins, 112 U.S.94, 109 (1884).

Citizenship Act of 1924, which conferred U.S. citizenship upon Indians who were
not yet citizens.
Most scholars attribute the passage of the Act in recognition of Indian men
for their service during World War I. However, the enactment of the 1924 Indian
Citizenship Act was not without controversy, especially among states. During its
enactment, "[iln the House, [I the only question on the Indian Citizenship Act
arose when [Representative] Finiss J. Garrett of Tennessee asked if the legislation
would affect state voting regulations. Snyder assured Garrett that it was 'not the
intention of the law to have any effect upon the suffkage qualifications in any
State.' It simply made the Indian 'an American citizen, subject to all restrictions to
which any other American citizen is subject, in any

Thus, "[tlhe

discussion in the House on May 3 made it unmistakably clear that state suffrage
qualifications were not to be affected by the new law."73
Although the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution were
passed to ensure that states would not deprive citizens of the "privileges or
immunities" of the Constitution, or deny citizens ftom voting, nothing was done to
ensure that Indians would be protected from states from infringing on their rights
as citizens. Thus, in states with a significant Indian population, Indians were

n Gary Stein, The Indian Citizenshio Act of 1924,259-260 (New Mexico Historical Society).

" Id. at 265.

denied the right to vote, and it was not until 1948 that every Indian got the right to
vote.
111.

AFTERMATH OF INDIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT: ENFORCEMENT OF
AMERICAN INDIAN RIGHT TO VOTE
The aftermath of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 was that Indians,

without the protection to enforce states from denying Indians the right to vote, had
to challenge each state that denied them the right to vote. This was an uphill
battled, since, it was at this point in history that states had become keen to their
authority with respect to elections. Despite state control over elections, once
granted citizenship Indians should have been entitled to same privileges and
immunities as other citizens, of which, by this time, the right to vote was deemed a
privilege and immunity74. Thus, how were states able to get around denying the
Indian the right to vote?
A.

STATE AUTHORITY WITH REPSECT TO ELECTIONS

There is no doubt that states have considerable control over the regulation
and administration of federal elections, and exclusive control over local elections.
The United States Constitution provides for states authority with respect to
elections in two instances. First, the Tenth Amendment relates to the states'
powers over local elections. And, second, the Election Clause bespeaks to the
states' authority with respect to federal elections. Both of these constitutional
74
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sections, however, are limited by the Guarantee Clause and several Amendments to
the Constitution, and case law suggests that states' authority over federal elections
also can be limited. In any event, understanding the scope of state authority over
both federal and state elections highlight delayed reaction of states in granting the
American Indian right to vote.
"Congress does not have general constitutional authority to legislate
regarding the administration of [state and local] election^,"^^ because it is
presumed under the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution that states
have exclusive control over the administration of state and local elections.76 The
Tenth Amendment provides that "[tlhe powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." However, such exclusive authority is subject to
both the Guarantee Clause, providing for a Republican Form of Government, as
~ifteenth~',
~ineteenth~',
~ w e n t ~ - ~ o u rand
t h ' Twenty~
well as the ~ourteenth'~,
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U.S. Const., amend. XV 5 1, provides "[tlhe right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
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79
U.S. Const., amend. X K 5 1, provides "[tlhe right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
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80
U.S. Const., amend. XXIV 5 1, provides "[tlh; right of citizens of the united States to vote in any
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sixth8' Amendments to the Constitution. Subject to these "explicit and welldefined substantive limits on state power"s2 by Congress, states retain much
control over elections and its process and structure.83
The source of state power over federal elections is found in the Election
Clause of the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, confers on
states broad authority to proscribe the "Times, Places and Manner" of
congressional elections, but "Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
[state] Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." "Manner" has
been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as "authority to provide a
complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in
relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters,
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors
and canvassers, and making and publication of elections returns."84 However,
"Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such [state] Regulations."

for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."
81
U.S. Const., amend. XXVI 5 1, provides "[tlhe right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States a by any State on
account of aee."
82
Todd J. ~ G i c k iFederal
,
Judicial Review of State Ballot Access Regulations: Esca~efrom the Political
Thicket, 20 T. Marshall L. Rev. 87.96 (1994).
83
The Twenty-Fourth ~mendmenitothe united States Constitution serves as an additional imposition on
states such that states shall not deny or abridge the right to vote of citizens of the United States for
"failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."
" Smilev v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355,366 (1932).

"The Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty."85 States have
argued that the power of the state to regulate elections, both federal and state is an
"attribute of state sovereignty and the element most essential to its existence" as a
~overeign,"'~and causes them to resist the federal government from interfering
with state administration of elections. The federal government, respects this
attribute of state sovereignty, and has recognized this by making adjustments to
state franchise of elections by "constitutional amendment rather than federal
legislati~n."~~
The United States Supreme Court, itself, has recognized this
concern, in that the issue of federalism is delicately balanced.88
States have been reluctant "to relinquish their long-standing control over the
regulation of election^,"^^ asserting that states have had this right before the
adoption of the Constitution. Congress responded by making "adjustments in the
state franchise [by] constitutional amendment rather than federal legislation."g0
This is illustrated in the wording of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, TwentyFourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. Nonetheless,
Congress' recognition of states' administration of both federal and state elections
got in the way of Congress safeguarding the American Indian right to vote.
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Just how did states get away with denying American Indians the right to
vote?
B.

ARIZONA
1)

PORTER V. HALL (1928)

Just two years after the enactment of the Indian Citizenship Act, the Indian
right to vote would be challenged. In Porter v. Hall, the Arizona county registrar
rehsed to "enter [plaintiffs's] names on the proper and general and precinct
registers of Pinal county" so that they could vote." The plaintiffs were members
of the Gila River Indian Reservation, who were born on the Gila Reservation, and
who resided there.92 The defendant precluded the plaintiffs' from registering
asserting that because the reservation, although geographically in the state of
Arizona, is "exclusively subject to and under the jurisdiction of the laws and courts
of the United States and the tribal customs of said Pima ~ r i b e , "it~"is
~ not subject
to the laws of the state of Arizona, and is, therefore, not a part of the state of
Arizona, either politically or governmentally. Therefore, the state argued that
plaintiffs were not residents of the state of Arizona within the meaning of the
~ ~addition, the defendant also argued, that
Constitution of the state of A r i ~ o n a . " In
as a result of this exclusiveness of the federal government, the defendant claimed

9'
92

34 Ariz. 308 313 (1928).
Id. at 312.

5.
"Id.
93

that the plaintiffs "are not sui juris," and therefore, a "guardian within the meaning
of the Constitution of the state of ~rizona."~'The plaintiffs denied that "they were
subject to any Indian tribal customs, or that the reservation was not subject to the
laws of Arizona, and alleging that they United States exercises no jurisdiction or
control over them or their property, except over certain property held in trust for
them."96
The suffrage requirements in Arizona at that time were that the voter be a
United States Citizen, over the age of 21, and be a resident of the state of Arizona
for at least one year?7 The two other election provisions dealt with criminals and
"persons under guardianship."98
The two issues the Arizona Supreme Court decided were: "[l)] Is the Gila
River Indian reservation within the political and governmental boundaries of the
state of Arizona, so that a residence thereon is residence in the state of Arizona,
with in the meaning of section 2, article 7 of [the Arizona] Constitution? [2)] Are
persons of Indian race, under the conditions set forth in the stipulation of facts as
being those in which plaintiffs find themselves, 'under guardianship', within the
meaning of the same section?"99

95

Id.

%1d.at 312.
"Id. at 323.
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Id.
Id.
-

at 315.

As to the first issue, the court determined that the plaintiffs were residents of
Arizona. The court reasoned that "[wle have no hesitancy in holding, therefore,
that all Indian reservations in Arizona are within the political and governmental, as
well as geographical, boundaries of the state, and that the exception set forth in our
Enabling Act applies to the Indian lands considered as property, and not as a
territorial area withdrawn from the sovereignty of the state of Arizona. Plaintiffs,
therefore, under the stipulation of facts, are residents of the state of Arizona, within
the meaning of section 2, article 7.,,I00
After finding that the plaintiffs were residents of the state of Arizona for
purposes of voter eligibility, the Arizona Supreme Court next determined whether
the plaintiffs were "under guardianship', within the meaning of the same section,"
as it was admitted that the plaintiffs were citizens, over the age of 21 and a resident
of Arizona.
The court stated that "[blroadly speaking, person under guardianship may be
defined as those who, because of some peculiarity of status, defect of age,
understanding of managing their own affairs, and who therefore have some other
person lawfully invested with the power and charged with the duty of taking care
of their persons or managing their property, or both [I [t]o put in a word, he is not
sui juris. It is apparent to us that it was the purpose of our [Arizona] Constitution,

Id. at 321.
-

by these three phrases, to disenfranchise all persons not sui juris, no matter what
the cause, and itsjustice is plain.,9101
The court then referred to the federal policy to assimilate the American
Indians, and construed this to mean that American Indians were not sui juris,
because the federal policy was understood to mean that Indians could not manage
their own affairs. The court determined then that because plaintiffs has always
resided on the Gila River Indian Reservation, subject to the law, rules, and
regulations of the federal government, subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Indian Offenses, and not subject to the laws of the state of Arizona, the court
concluded that "[wle need go no further to determine that plaintiffs have not been
emancipated from their guardianship, and to some extent, at least, are not subject
to the laws of the state of Arizona, in the same manner as are ordinary citizens.,9102
The court commented that this guardianship would cease to exist only when
Congress said so, despite the fact that the plaintiffs in this case had denied that they
were subject to any Indian tribal customs. The court did, however, mention that
"[wle heartily approve of the present announced policy of the federal government
that, so soon as its Indian wards are fitted therefore, they should be released from
their guardianship and placed in the ranks of citizens of the United States and of
the state of their residence, as sui juris, subject to all the responsibilities and

entitled to all the privileges of such status."'03 The court would prefer to hear from
the federal government that the expression must be clearly expressed: "Whenever
that government shall determine in regard to any Indian or class of Indians that
they are so released, and that their status in regard to the responsibilities of
citizenship is the same as that of any other citizen, the law of this state considers
them no longer 'persons under guardianship, [I and they will be entitled to vote on
the same terms as all other citizens.9,104
It is interesting to note that the court failed to recognize or even mention in
its reasoning the Indian Citizenship Act. The dissent however did recognize that
the Indian Citizenship Act was "general and all-inclusive," such that "[bleing
citizens of the United States and admittedly possessing all the qualifications
provided for by our Constitution and laws, as to residence, education, etc., they are
entitled to be registered as voters, and to vote, unless they fall with the exceptions
The dissent would have found that the Arizona
of the [Arizona] ~onstitution."'~~
constitutional provision "persons under guardianship" did not apply. The
dissenting judge interpreted the law differently with respect to Indian guardianship
to mean that "[ilt is not a guardianship ,but as Marshall said, it 'resembles' a
guardianship.,,I06 The justice then commented that "[ilt may be that these

lo'
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plaintiffs, and others in their situation, should not, as a matter of public policy, be
granted the ftanchise, since they are not entirely emancipated fiom federal control,
nor amenable while on the reservation to the state laws; but as the laws are now
written it seems to me they are entitled to register and to vote."lo7 This is a drastic
contrast ftom the majority opinion.
Unfortunately, Porter v. Hall would remain good law for twenty years. It
would not be until 1948 that the Arizona Supreme Court would overrule it.
2)

HARRISON V. LAVEEN (1948)

As states began to grant American Indians the right to vote after the passage
of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, it increased the public pressure in other
states to grant Native Americans the right to vote. There were also other pressures
that forced states to grant American Indians the right to vote. First, the "[fJederal
government was threatening to withdraw funds fiom states which denied social
security to Indians.,,I08 A second pressure was that it '%as becoming increasingly
difficult for the United States to condemn Communist regimes for mistreatment of
their citizens while American citizens were being denied equality on the basis of

By 1948, only two states in the union denied American Indians
race and c o l ~ r . " ' ~
the right to vote. The two states were Arizona and New Mexico.

lo'
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In Harrison v. Laveen, the Arizona Supreme Court overruled Porter v. Hall.
In Harrison, two members of the "Mohave-Apache Indian Tribe, residing on the
Fort McDowell Indian Reservation, [I sought to register preparatoty to exercising
their claimed right of franchise.,9110 The county recorder refused to permit them,
and the Indian plaintiffs sued. The plaintiffs claimed that they "possessed all the
qualifications for suffrage set forth in the constitution and laws of the state of
Arizona, and asserted that if they were denied the right to register and vote they
would be deprived of the franchises, immunities, rights, and privileges of citizens
which are guaranteed to them under the constitution and laws of both the United
States and the State of Arizona.""'

The plaintiffs claimed that they each owned

property, paid state taxes, that they were subject to both the civil and criminal laws
of the state, and permitted to leave the Fort McDowell Indian Reservation at any
time."'
The issue in this case was "basically the same question [I as was presented
in the Porter case, and that is, are plaintiffs person 'under guardianship' within the
meaning of section 2, article 7 of the Arizona Constitution. [I If this primary
question be answered in the affirmative, as it was in the Porter case, then we must
determine whether such denial of the franchise to plaintiffs violates the Fourteenth

'lo
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and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United ~tates.""~The court
never reached this last question, since it determined that Indians were not "persons
under guardianship".
It is interesting to consider the court's approach in overruling Porter. First, it
noted in its opinion that 11.5% of the State's population at that time were Indians,
which was the largest minority group in that state.'14 Second, the President's
Committee on Civil Rights just issued a report, which called for the
~ that report it
enfranchisement of Indians in Arizona and New ~ e x i c o . ' ' In
"brand[ed] the decision in the Porter case as being di~criminatory.""~Lastly, the
court mentioned and referred to the Indian citizenship Act of 1924. The court also
acknowledged that "during the twenty years that have elapsed since the decision in
the Porter case some significant changes have taken place in the legal position of
the Indian which have a bearing upon the applicability of that decision to
contemporary conditions.9,117
With all of this negative attention, the court accepted that its decision in

Porter was wrong.

The court viewed the Porter decision as "a tortuous

construction by the judicial branch of a simply phrase 'under guardianship',

"'Id. at 341.
' I 4. ,

.,

,6I'

"'Id. at 343.

accomplishing a purpose that was never designed by its

framer^.""^

The court

then explained non sui juris and what it meant in terms of guardianship. The court
emphasized specific instances where Indians were able to sue in court. Thus, the
court held "[tlhe term 'guardianship' has a very definite meaning, both at common
law and under the Arizona statutes, [of which] [I [nlone of the foregoing
characteristics apply to the plaintiffs or to other Indian citizens similarly
situated.,,I19
Furthermore, the court stated "It is axiomatic that if a person is under
guardianship he must have a guardian. If an Indian, living on a reservation, is
under guardianship the United States presumably must be his guardian. Yet in the
instant case the United States is appearing specially in this litigation as amicus
curiae to disclaim any intention to treat the plaintiffs as 'persons under
guardianship'. Certainly the state courts cannot make the United States a guardian
against its will.

[I

Furthermore, to ascribe to all Indians residing on reservations

the quality of being 'incapable of handing their own affairs in an ordinary manner'
would be a grave injustice, for amongst them are educated persons as l l l y capable

of handling their affairs as their white neighbors. This leads us to the conclusion
that the framers of the constitution had in mind situations where disabilities are

"'Id. at 345.
'I9

- at 347-348.
Id.

established on an individual rather than a tribal basis. ,9120 Having made this
conclusion, the court never reached the federal constitutional question, as to
whether denial of the franchise to plaintiffs violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
It is this issue that would be determined by the New Mexico Federal District
Court in the case of Truiillo v. Garlev.
C.

NEW MEXICO

1)

TRUJILLO V. GARLEY (1948)

After Hanison v. Laveen, New Mexico became the only state that continued
to disenfranchise American Indians.
Attempts to challenge the election provision of the New Mexico
Constitution were few. However, many of those attempts were later withdrawn,
due in part to the fact that tribal governments forced the individual members to
withdraw their suits. The biggest concern of the tribal governments were that if
their tribal members were to vote in state elections, the tribes might be subject to
the jurisdiction of the states, or that the states would then be able to tax Indians.
In New Mexico, "in a state where the majority party held power by an 8,000
vote margin, not everyone favored enfranchisement of some 20,000 Indian

'"Id.- at 348.

vote^."'^' In the struggle to gain the right to vote, rumors spread that if Indians
obtained the right to vote, then it would allow for the state to tax them. This rumor
instilled fear into many tribes and had an effect on a pending lawsuit challenging
the "Indians not taxed provision." Two Zuni Pueblos members and a Navajo tribal
member filed a suit in federal district court challenging the "Indians not taxed"
provision, however, it was at the request of the Zuni tribal Council that the Zuni
plaintiffs withdrawn their

The Council explained "that the elders of the

pueblo, feared a favorable opinion giving the Indians the right to vote would result
automatically in their reservation lands being taxed.9,123 Thus, the lawsuit was
withdrawn. However, it would not be long before Miguel H. Trujillo, an Isleta
Pueblo tribal member, would file his own suit challenging the "Indians not taxed"
provision.

On July 15, 1948, Miguel H. Trujillo attempted to register to vote in
Valencia County but was denied on the grounds that he was an "Indian not taxed"
despite him meeting the other state qualifications for voting. An ex-Marine,
educator, and at the time of this denial a candidate for Master's degree at the
University of New Mexico, Trujillo wanted to "bring equality to the Indian

121

Bronitsky, Indians and Civil Riehts: The S t w of Mirmel Tmiillo 7 7.
Fearing Reservation Lands Taxes, Zunis Withdraw Efforts to Achieve Franchise, Gallup Independent
(July 17, 1948).
lZ3 Id.
122

people."'"

For some time, Trujillo "had tried unsuccessfully to get the [All Indian

Pueblo Council] to unite on the issue of the Indian vote, and decided to go ahead
on his own."'25 As a result, Trujillo initiated his own lawsuit challenging Article
VII, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution.
In his lawsuit, Trujillo argued that the "Indians not taxed" provision violated
the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because "persons of
other races are accepted for [voter] registration regardless of any question of
taxation.,9126 The major assertion for this violation was that the prohibition on
Indian voting "was eliminated when the last non-citizen Indian was made a citizen
in 1974.,9127 Thus, when Indians were made citizens in 1924, they could not longer
be denied the right to vote an account of race under the Fifteenth Amendment
because the Fifteenth Amendment applied to "citizens."lZ8 In addition, the

.

Fourteenth Amendment would be violated as well.
Granting the 20,000 Indians in New Mexico the right to vote would impact
elections results, and that was the biggest concern to the state. However, Attorney
for the Plaintiff reassured the court that states still maintained the authority to
control elections: "[Nlo one denies that taxation, literacy, or age may be elements
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in constitutionally valid electoral requirements. But these elements, proper in
themselves, cannot be linked with any requirements which in terns or in substance
bring race, color, or previous condition of servitude into the determination of a
man's right to vote.,9129
On August 11, 1948, the three judge panel for the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico concluded that "the denial of registration to
the plaintiff and other persons similarly situated with plaintiff is a denial of rights
protected by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States."
This conclusion however received a mixed reaction. For Miguel Tmjillo
this was triumphant ruling. However, tribes in New Mexico were still unsure
whether this ruling would have an affect of Indians lands being taxed. After the
ruling, Attorney for the Plaintiff immediately assured tribes that there was nothing
to fear because the "[alctual event revealed the emptiness of the these fears.9,130
Thus, this is how New Mexico became the last state in the Union to grant
Native American the right to vote.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The enfranchisement of the American Indian has been a long, drawn out

struggle which could have been prevented had there been a constitutional
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amendment specifically dealing with Indian voting rights. Despite the fact that
most states came to see that the federal constitution, with the addition of the Civil

War amendments, compelled the giving of the franchise to all American Indians,
the foot dragging by Arizona and New Mexico stand out as a form of residual
racism which was used largely to avoid the political consequences of mass Indian
registration where the Indian populations were sufficient to make a real difference
in electoral outcomes. Although there may be other important unresolved
constitutional issues surrounding the status of tribes and tribal members, the sad
tale of the voting rights of American Indians is one which has been properly, if
belatedly, resolved.

